Historically and traditionally, it has been the task of the scien disciplines to teach about natural things: how they are and they work. It has been the task of engineering schools to t about artificial things: how to make artifacts that have de properties and how to design.
Engineers are not the only professional designers. Every designs who devises courses of action aimed at changing existi situations into preferred ones. The intellectual activity t produces material artifacts is no different fundamentally from one that precribes remedies for a sick patient or the one t devises a new sales plan for a company or a social welfare policy a state. Design, so construed, is the core of all profess training: it is the principal mark that distinguishes the profess from the sciences. Schools of engineering, as well as schoo architecture, business, education, law, and medicine, are centrally concerned with the process of design.
In view of the key role of design in professional activity, it ironic that in this century the natural sciences have almost dr the sciences of the artificial from professional school curr Engineering schools have become schools of physics and ma matics; medical schools have become schools of biological sci business schools have become schools of finite mathematics. Th use of adjectives like "applied" conceals, but does not change, t fact. It simply means that in the professional schools those to are selected from mathematics and the natural sciences for emphasis which are thought to be most nearly relevant to professional practice. It does not mean that design is taught, as distinguished from analysis.
The movement toward natural science and away from the sciences of the artificial has proceeded further and faster in engineering, business, and medicine than in the other professional fields I have mentioned, though it has by no means been absent from schools of law, journalism, and library science. The stronger universities are more deeply affected than the weaker, and the graduate programs more than the undergraduate. genuine design problems, as distinguished from problems in solidstate physics or stochastic processes. I have to make partial exceptions -for reasons I shall mention -of dissertations in computer science and management science, and there are undoubtedly some others, for example, in chemical engineering.
Such a universal phenomenon must have a basic cause. It does have a very obvious one. As professional schools, including the independent engineering schools, are more and more absorbed into the general culture of the university, they hanker after academic respectability. In terms of the prevailing norms, academic respectability calls for subject matter that is intellectually tough, analytic, formalizable, and teachable. In the past much, if not most, of what we knew about design and about the artificial sciences was intellectually soft, intuitive, informal, and cookbooky. Why would anyone in a university stoop to teach or learn about designing machines or planning market strategies when he could concern himself with solid-state physics? The answer has been clear: he usually wouldn't.
The problem is widely recognized in engineering and medicine today and to a lesser extent in business. Some do not think it a problem, because they regard schools of applied science as a superior alternative to the trade schools of the past. If that were the choice, we could agree.1 But neither alternative is satisfactory.
The older kind of professional school did not know how to educate for professional design at an intellectual level appropriate to a university; the newer kind of school has nearly abdicated responsibility for training in the core professional skill. Thus we are faced with a problem of devising a professional school that can attain two objectives simultaneously: education in both artificial and natural science at a high intellectual level. This too is a problem of design -organizational design.
The kernel of the problem lies in the phrase "artificial science."
In my previous chapters I have shown that a science of artificial phenomena is always in imminent danger of dissolving and vanishing. The peculiar properties of the artifact lie on the thin interface between the natural laws within it and the natural laws without. What can we say about it? What is there to study besides the boundary sciences -those that govern the means and the task environment?
The artificial world is centered precisely on this interface between the inner and outer environments; it is concerned with attaining goals by adapting the former to the latter. The proper study of those who are concerned with the artificial is the way in which that adaptation of means to environments is brought about -and central to that is the process of design itself. The professional schools will reassume their professional responsibilities just to the degree that they can discover a science of design, a body of intellectually tough, analytic, partly formalizable, partly empirical, teachable doctrine about the design process.
It is the thesis of this chapter that such a science of design not only is possible but is actually emerging at the present time. It has already begun to penetrate the engineering schools, particularly through programs in computer science and "systems engineering," and business schools through management science. Perhaps it also has beach-heads in other professional curricula, but these are the two with which I am most familiar. We can already see enough of its shape to predict some of the important ways in which engineering schools tomorrow will differ from departments of physics, and business schools from departments of economics and psychology. Let me now turn from questions of university organization to the substance of the matter. We must start with some question of logic.2 The natural sc are concerned with how things are. Ordinary systems -the standard propositional and predicate calculi, say these sciences well. Since the concern of standard logic declarative statements, it is well suited for assertions a world and for inferences from those assertions.
Design, on the other hand, is concerned with how things to be, with devising artifacts to attain goals. We might whether the forms of reasoning that are appropriate to science are suitable also for design. One might well supp introduction of the verb "should" may require additional r inference, or modification of the rules already imbed declarative logic.
Paradoxes of Imperative Logic Various "paradoxes" have been constructed to demonstr need for a distinct logic of imperatives, or a normative logic. In ordinary logic from "Dogs are pets" and "Cats are one can infer "Dogs and cats are pets." But from "Dogs are "Cats are pets," and "You should keep pets," one can inf should keep cats and dogs?" And from "Give me ne thread!" can one deduce, in analogy with declarative log me needle or thread!"? Easily frustrated people would p rather have neither needle nor thread than one without th and peaceloving people, neither cats nor dogs, rather than As a response to these challenges of apparent paradox have been developed a number of constructions of modal lo handling "should," "shalts," and "oughts" of various k think it is fair to say that none of these systems h sufficiently developed or sufficiently widely applied to strate that it is adequate to handle the logical requirements process of design. Fortunately, such a demonstration is really not essential, for it can be shown that the requirements of design can be met fully by a modest adaptation of ordinary declarative logic. Thus a special logic of imperatives is unnecessary.3
Reduction to Declarative Logic
The easiest way to discover what kinds of logic are needed for design is to examine what kinds of logic designers use when they are being careful about their reasoning. Now there would be no point in doing this if designers were always sloppy fellows who reasoned loosely, vaguely, and intuitively. Then we might say that whatever logic they used was not the logic they should use. The logic of optimization methods can be sketched as follows:
The "inner environment" of the design problem is represented by a set of given alternatives of action. The alternatives may be given in extenso: more commonly they are specified in terms of command variables that have defined domains. The "outer environment" is represented by a set of parameters, which may be known with certainty or only in terms of a probability distribution.
The goals for adaptation of inner to outer environment are defined by a utility function -a function, usually scalar, of the command variables and environmental parameters -perhaps supplemented by a number of constraints (inequalities, say, between functions of the command variables and environmenta 4) The use of the notion of "possible worlds" to embed the logic of imperatives in declarative logic goes back at least to Jiirgen Jurgensen, "Imperatives and Logic," Erkenntnis, 7 (1937 Erkenntnis, 7 ( -1938 sign attached) of the diet, subject to the constraints, say, that it not contain more than 2,000 calories per day, that it meet specified minimum needs for vitamins and minerals, and that rutabaga not be eaten more than once a week. The constraints may be viewed as characterizing the inner environment. The problem is to select the quantities of foods that will meet the nutritional requirements and side conditions at the given prices for the lowest cost.
The diet problem is a simple example of a class of problems that are readily handled, even when the number of variables is exceedingly large, by the mathematical formalism known as linear programming. I shall come back to the technique a little later. My present concern is with the logic of the matter.
Since the optimization problem, once formalized, is a standard mathematical problem -to maximize a function subject to constraints -it is evident that the logic used to deduce the answer is the standard logic of the predicate calculus on which mathematics rests. How does the formalism avoid making use of a special logic of imperatives? It does so by dealing with sets of possible worlds:
First consider all the possible worlds that meet the constraints of the outer environment; then find the particular world in the set that meets the remaining constraints of the goal and maximizes the utility function. The logic is exactly the same as if we were to adjoin the goal constraints and the maximation requirement, as new "natural laws," to the existing natural laws embodied in the environmental conditions. Only in trivial cases is the computation of the optimum alternative an easy matter. If utility theory is to have application to real-life design problems, it must be accompanied by tools for actually making the computations. The dilemma of the rational chess player is familiar to all. The optimal strategy in chess is easily demonstrated: simply assign a value of +1 to a win, 0 to a draw, -1 to a loss; consider all possible courses of play; minimax backward from the outcome of each, assuming each player will take the most favorable move at any given point. This procedure will determine what move to make now. The only trouble is that the computations required are astronomical (the number 10120 is often mentioned in this context) and hence cannot be carried out -not by humans, not by existing computers, not by prospective computers.
A theory of design as applied to the game of chess would encompass not only the utopian minimax principle but also some practicable procedures for finding good moves in actual board positions in real time, within the computational capacities of real human beings or real computers. No exceptionally good procedures of this kind exist today, other than those stored in the memories of grandmasters, but there is at least one computer program that plays at the level of an expert or a weak master -that is, better than all save a few hundred human players.
The second topic then for the curriculum in the science of design consists in the efficient computational techniques that are available for actually finding optimum courses of action in real situations, or reasonable approximations to real situations. As I mentioned in chapter 2, that topic has a number of important components today, most of them developed -at least to the level of practical application -within the past 25 years. These include linear programming theory, dynamic programming, geometric programming, queuing theory, and control theory.
THE LOGIC OF DESIGN; FINDING ALTERNATIVES
When we take up the case where the design alternatives are given in any constructive sense but must be synthesized, we mu ask once more whether any new forms of reasoning are involved the synthesis, or whether again the standard logic of declarativ statements is all we need.
In the case of optimization we asked: "Of all possible worl (those attainable for some admissible values of the action variab which is the best (yields the highest value of the criter function)?" As we saw, this is a purely empirical question, callin only for facts and ordinary declarative reasoning to answer it.
In this case, where we are seeking a satisfactory alternative, once we have found a candidate we can ask: "Does this alternative satisfy all the design criteria?" Clearly this is also a factual question and raises no new issues of logic. But how about the process of searching for candidates? What kind of logic is needed for the search?
5) Notice that we are not saying that the two kinds of channels operate independently of each other, since they surely do not in living organisms, but that we can distinguish conceptually, and to some extent neurologically, between the incoming and outgoing flows.
Means-Ends Analysis
The condition of any goal-seeking system is that it is connected to the outside environment through two kinds of channels: the afferent, or sensory, channels through which it receives information about the environment and the efferent, or motor, channels through which it acts on the environment.5 The system must have some means of storing in its memory information about states of the world -afferent, or sensory, information -and information about actions -efferent, or motor, information.
Ability to attain goals depends on building up associations, which may be simple or very complex, between particular changes in states of the world and particular actions that will (reliably or not)
bring these changes about. In chapter 4 we described these associations as productions.
Except for a few built-in reflexes, an infant has no basis for correlating his sensory information with his actions. A very important part of his early learning is that particular actions or sequences of actions will bring about particular changes in the state of the world as he senses it. Until he builds up this knowledge, the world of sense and the motor world are two entirely separate, entirely unrelated worlds. Only as he begins to acquire experience as to how elements of the one relate to elements of the other can he act purposefully on the world.
The computer problem-solving program called GPS, designed to model some of the main features of human problem solving, exhibits in stark form how goal-directed action depends on building this kind of bridge between the afferent and the efferent worlds. On the afferent, or sensory, side, GPS must be able to represent desired situations or desired objects as well as the present situation. It must be able also to represent differences between the desired and the present. On the efferent side, GPS must be able to represent actions that change objects or situations.
To behave purposefully, GPS must be able to select from time to time those particular actions that are likely to remove the particular differences between desired and present states that the system detects. In the machinery of GPS, this selection is achieved through a productions, which relate the afferent to the efferent world. Since reaching a goal generally requires a sequence of actions, and since some attempts may be ineffective, GPS must also have means for detecting the progress it is making (the changes in the differences between the actual and the desired) and for trying alternate paths. Now the real worlds to which problem solvers and designers address themselves are seldom completely additive in this sense.
Actions have side consequences (may create new differences) and sometimes can only be taken when certain side conditions are satisfied (call for removal of other differences before they become applicable). Under these circumstances one can never be certain that a partial sequence of actions that accomplishes certain goals can be augmented to provide a solution that satisfied all the conditions and attains all the goals (even though they be satisficing goals) of the problem.
For this reason problem-solving systems and design procedures in the real world do not merely assemble problem solutions from components but must search for appropriate assemblies. In carrying out such a search, it is often efficient to divide one's eggs among a number of baskets -that is, not to follow out one line until it succeeds completely or fails definitely but to begin to explore several tentative paths, continuing to pursue a few that look most promising at a given moment. If one of the active paths begins to look less promising, it may be replaced by another that had previously been assigned a lower priority.
Our discussion of design when the alternatives are not given has yielded at least three additional topics for instruction in the science of design: 3. Adaptation of standard logic to the search for alternatives.
Design solutions are sequences of actions that lead to possible worlds satisfying specified constraints. With satisficing goals the sought-for possible worlds are seldom unique; the search is for sufficient, not necessary, actions for attaining goals.
4. The exploitation ofparallel, or near-parallel, factorizations of differences. Means-ends analysis is an example of a broadly applicable problem-solving technique that exploits this factorization.
5. The allocation of resources for search to alternative, partly explored action sequences. I should like to elaborate somewhat on this last-mentioned topic.
DESIGN AS RESOURCE ALLOCATION
There are two ways in which design processes are concer the allocation of resources. First, conservation of scarce may be one of the criteria for a satisfactory design. Seco design process itself involves management of the resources of the designer, so that his efforts will not be dissipated unnecessarily in following lines of inquiry that prove fruitless.
There is nothing special that needs to be said here about resource conservation -cost minimization, for example, as a design criterion. Cost minimization has always been an implicit consideration in the design of engineering structures, but until a few years ago it generally was only implicit, rather than explicit.
More and more cost calculations have been brought explicitly into the design procedure, and a strong case can be made today for training design engineers in that body of technique and theory that economists know as "cost-benefit analysis." In my first chapter I gave some reasons why complex s might be expected to be constructed in a hierarchy of levels boxes-within-boxes form. The basic idea is that the several components in any complex system will perform particular subfunctions that contribute to the over-all function. Just as the "inner environment" of the whole system may be defined by describing its functions, without detailed specification of its mechanisms, so the "inner environment" of each of the subsystems may be defined by describing the functions of that subsystem, without detailed specification of its submechanisms.6
To design such a complex structure, one powerful technique is to discover viable ways of decomposing it into semi-independent components corresponding to its many functional parts. The design of each component can then be carried out with some degree of independence of the design of others, since each will affect the others largely through its function and independently of the details of the mechanisms that accomplish the function.7
There is no reason to expect that the decomposition of the complete design into functional components will be unique. In tives against a whole array of requirements and constraints. There need not be merely a single generate-test cycle, but there can be a whole nested series of such cycles. The generators implicitly define the decomposition of the design problem, and the tests guarantee that important indirect consequences will be noticed and weighed.
Alternative decompositions correspond to different ways of dividing the responsibilities for the final design between generators and tests.
To take a greatly oversimplified example, a series of generators may generate one or more possible outlines and schemes of fenestration for a building, while tests may be applied to determine whether needs for particular kinds of rooms can be met within the outlines generated. Alternatively the generators may be used to evolve the structure of rooms, while tests are applied to see whether they are consistent with an acceptable over-all shape and design. The house can be designed from the outside in or from the inside out.8
Alternatives are also open, in organizing the design process, as to how far development of possible subsystems will be carried before the over-all coordinating design is developed in detail, or vice-versa, how far the over-all design should be carried before various components, or possible components, are developed. These alternatives of design are familiar to architects. They are familiar also to composers, who must decide how far the architectonics of a musical structure will be evolved before some of the component musical themes and other elements have been invented. Computer programmers face the same choices, between working downward from executive routines to subroutines or upward from component subroutines to a coordinating executive.
A theory of design will include principles -most of which do not yet exist -for deciding such questions of precedence and sequence in the design process.
Process as a Determinant of Style
When we recall that the process will generally be concerned with finding a satisfactory design, rather than an optimum design, we see that sequence and the division of labor between generators and tests can affect not only the efficiency with which resources for designing are used but also the nature of the final design as well.
What we ordinarily call "style" may stem just as much from these decisions about the design process as from alternative emphases on the goals to be realized through the final design. An architect who designs buildings from the outside in will arrive at quite different buildings from one who designs from the inside out, even though both of them might agree on the characteristics that a satisfactory building should possess. When we come to the design of systems as complex as cities, or buildings, or economies, we must give up the aim of creating systems that will optimize some hypothesized utility function, and we must consider whether differences in style of the sort I have just been describing do not represent highly desirable variants in the design process rather than alternatives to be evaluated as "better" or "worse." Variety, within the limits of satisfactory constraints, may be a desirable end in itself, among other reasons, because it permits us to attach value to the search as well as its outcome -to regard the design process as itself a valued activity for those who participate in it.
We have usually thought of city planning as a means whereby the planner's creative activity could build a system that would satisfy the needs of a populace. Perhaps we should think of city planning as a valuable creative activity in which many members of a community can have the opportunity of participating -if we have wits to organize the process that way. I shall have more to say on these topics in the next chapter.
However that may be, I hope I have illustrated sufficiently that both the shape of the design and the shape and organization of the design process are essential components of a theory of design.
These topics constitute the sixth item in my proposed curriculum In a completely pragmatic vein we know that problems can be described verbally, in natural language. They often can be described mathematically, using standard formalisms of algebra, geometry, set theory, analysis, or topology. If the problems relate to physical objects, they (or their solutions) can be represented by floor plans, engineering drawings, renderings, or three-dimensional models. Problems that have to do with actions can be attacked with flow charts and programs.
Other items most likely will need to be added to the list, and there may exist more fundamental and significant ways of classifying its members. But even though our classification is incomplete, and perhaps superficial, we can begin to build a theory of the properties of these representations. A number of topics in the growing theories of machines and of programming languages may give us some notion of the directions that a theory of representations -at least on its more formal side -may take.14 These topics can also provide, at the beginning, some of the substance for the final subject in our program on the theory of design:
7. Alternative representations for design problems. Because these computer programs describe complex design processes in complete, painstaking detail, they are open to full inspection and analysis, or to trial by simulation. They constitute a body of empirical phenomena to which the student of design can address himself and which he can seek to understand. There is no question, since these programs exist, of the design process hiding behind the cloak of "judgment" or "experience." Whatever judgment or experience was used in creating the programs must now be incorporated in them and hence be observable. The programs are the tangible record of the variety of schemes that man has devised to explore his complex outer environment and to discover in that environment the paths to his goals. Music involves a formal pattern. It has few (but impo contacts with the inner environment; that is, it is cap evoking strong emotions, its patterns are detectable by listeners, and some of its harmonic relations can be given p and physiological interpretations (though the esthetic im these is debatable). As for the outer environment, when we composition as a problem in design, we encounter just th tasks of evaluation, of search for alternatives, and of represe that we do in any other design problem. If it pleases us, we c apply to music some of the same techniques of automati by computer that have been used in other fields of de computer-composed music has not yet reached notable heigh esthetic excellence, it deserves, and has already received, attention from professional composers and analysts, who find it written in tongues alien to them.15 Undoubtedly there are tone-deaf engineers, just as there are mathematically ignorant composers. Few engineers and composers, whether deaf, ignorant, or not, can carry on a mutually rewarding conversation about the content of each other's professional work. What I am suggesting is that they can carry on such a conversation about design, can begin to perceive the common creative activity in which they are both engaged, can begin to share their experiences of the creative, professional design process.
ROLE OF DESIGN IN THE LIFE OF THE MIND
Those of us who have lived close to the development of the modern computer through gestation and infancy have been drawn from a wide variety of professional fields, music being one of them.
We have noticed the growing communication among intellectual disciplines that takes place around the computer. We have welcomed it, because it has brought us into contact with new worlds of knowledge -has helped us combat our own multiplecultures isolation. This breakdown of old disciplinary boundaries has been much commented upon, and its connection with computers and the information sciences often noted.
But surely the computer, as a piece of hardware, or even as a piece of programmed software, has nothing to do directly with the matter. I have already suggested a different explanation. The ability to communicate across fields -the common groundcomes from the fact that all who use computers in complex ways are using computers to design or to participate in the process of design. Consequently we as designers, or as designers of design processes, have had to be explicit as never before about what is involved in creating a design and what takes place while the creation is going on.
The real subjects of the new intellectual free trade among the many cultures are our own thought processes, our processes of judging, deciding, choosing, and creating. We are importing and exporting from one intellectual discipline to another ideas about how a serially organized information-processing system like a human being -or a computer, or a complex of men and women and computers in organized cooperation -solves problems and achieves goals in outer environments of great complexity.
The proper study of mankind has been said to be man. But I have argued that man -or at least the intellective component of man -may be relatively simple, that most of the complexity of his behavior may be drawn from man's environment, from man's search for good designs. If I have made my case, then we can conclude that, in large part, the proper study of mankind is the science of design, not only as the professional component of a technical education but as a core discipline for every liberally educated person.
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